Several authors have reported finding a negative correlation between prices and output for the U.S. in the post WW II data. This paper presents a simple aggregate supply and demand model to show that this correlation may reflect the actions of an optimizing monetary policy maker rather than the relative sizes of the aggregate demand and supply shocks which hit the economy. Because the optimizing policy maker seeks to offset fully the effects of aggregate demand shocks, when the policy maker views these shocks with greater precision, the observed correlation of prices and output falls and can become negative. Importantly, our model is consistent with the observed changed in the price-output correlation between the pre WW II and post WW II periods. 1
Introduction
N. Gregory Mankiw's (1989, p. 88) statement that real business cycles cannot explain the fact that inflation tends to rise during booms and fall during recessions initiated a high-stakes debate over whether the correlation between prices (or inflation) and output is positive or negative. Kydland and Prescott (1990) responded forcefully to this threat to the empirical relevance of real-business cycle models. They presented evidence which allowed them to conclude that "any theory in which procyclical prices figure crucially in accounting for postwar business cycle fluctuations is doomed to failure. The facts we report indicate that the price level since the Korean War moves countercyclically" ( p. 17).
The above papers initiated the recent literature on the cyclical behavior of prices (discussed in section 2, below), a literature largely concerned with measuring the correlation between fluctuations in the price level (or inflation) and fluctuations in output. If, as many writers suggest, Keynesian, monetarist and new-classical models predict that the correlation between prices and output is positive, while real-business cycle models predict that it must be negative, then the correct measurement of this correlation between prices and output has important implications for macroeconomic theory in general and business-cycle theory in particular. But the literature on the cyclical behavior of prices largely, though not completely, ignores the effect of monetary policy on the correlation between the price level and output. This paper examines how an optimal monetary policy affects this correlation and shows that measuring the correlation coefficient between unexpected changes in the price level and unexpected changes in output tells us more about monetary policy than it does about the underlying structure of the economy.
For example, Backus and Kehoe (1992) analyze data for ten industrialized countries and find that in each one the correlation between output and the price level (or inflation) is either negative or not significantly different from zero after the second world war. But, for all countries but Japan, the correlation is positive or not significantly different from zero prior to the war. One interpretation of these results is that aggregate supply shocks have been the dominant force behind output fluctuations since the second world war, while (excepting Japan) aggregate demand shocks were the dominant force prior to the war. This would imply that the real business cycle model is approximately correct since the war, but was not approximately correct before the war. Or, similarly, since the war Keynesian, monetarist or new-classical models have not been correct, but they were correct prior to the war.
The simple model of optimal monetary policy presented below shows that the change from positive to negative correlations during the post-war period can be explained by a plausible change in monetary policy, a change from a largely passive monetary policy under the gold standard (McKinnon, 1993: 10-11 ) to a largely discretionary policy during the postwar period.
The model predicts that as long as the monetary authority attempts to stabilize both inflation and output, then the more effective is monetary policy (in a sense to be made precise below), the more likely it is that the correlation between prices and output will be negative. Hence the negative correlation between output and prices since the war could be the result of an increase in the effectiveness of monetary policy rather than a sign of the growing importance of supply-side shocks. On the other hand the positive correlation between output and prices prior to the war was due to the absence of an effective (short-run) monetary policy under the gold standard.
The model employed here is an aggregate supply and demand model in which the monetary authority views contemporaneous shocks with error. Since the monetary authority has information not available to the private sector, monetary policy in this model can be stabilizing, even though the model assumes rational expectations and includes a Lucas aggregate supply curve. The monetary authority sets an interest rate target so as to minimize its expected loss resulting from the deviations of output and inflation from their target values. The monetary authority attempts to offset fully shocks to aggregate demand. But because they observe the shocks to aggregate demand with an error, these observation errors lead to a positive correlation between inflation and output (since these errors cause the aggregate demand curve to either overshoot or undershoot its target).
Aggregate supply shocks cause output and inflation to deviate from their target values in opposite directions. Thus, attempts to return inflation to its target value cause the output gap to grow, while attempts to return output to its target value cause the inflation gap to grow. As a result, the effect of a supply shock on the economy can never be fully offset by the monetary authority. The response to supply shocks depends on the monetary authority's preferences between inflation losses and output losses. As long as weight is placed on both goals, aggregate supply shocks will impart a negative correlation between prices and output.
In this model, more effective monetary policy corresponds to increased precision in reading the shocks which hit the economy. In the limiting case where these shocks are read perfectly, the correlation between prices and output must become negative. In this case, aggregate demand shocks are always precisely offset, but even fully observable aggregate supply shocks result in deviations of price and output from their target levels which are opposite in sign.
However, this negative correlation does not tell us the relative magnitude of supply and demand shocks and, because it is the result of a successfully implemented monetary policy, does not imply that monetary policy is ineffective. That is, optimal monetary policy can change the sign of the price-output correlation and a negative correlation is consistent with a model in which policy is effective. Section 2 below offers a brief review of the literature concerned with the correlation between prices and output. Section 3 presents the model, which is then employed in section 4 to show how policy affects the correlation between prices and output.
Previous Literature
Among the first to point out the negative correlation between prices and output in the postwar era are Friedman and Schwartz (1982: 402) , who analyze U.S. and U.K. data.
Subsequent to Friedman and Schwartz, a number of economists have provided statistical analyses for the U.S. which have established both a positive correlation between prices and output prior to World War II and a negative correlation during the postwar period. These studies include Kydland and Prescott (1990) , Cooley and Ohanian (1991) , Wolf (1991) , Smith (1992) and Backus and Kehoe (1992) . These results seem generally to be robust to the method of detrending the data, and Smith (1992) and Backus and Kehoe (1992) establish that these results generally hold across 10 industrialized nations. 1 Several commentators have interpreted the postwar correlation between money and output as being evidence against aggregate demand driven models. Kydland and Prescott (1990: 7) argue that the observation that prices and output are negatively correlated renders research in which price level surprises raise output (e.g., Lucas 1972) unnecessary. Cooley and Ohanian (1991: 30) state, "Our finding of no consistent positive relationship between prices and output is strikingly different from the assumed correlations that motivate the identifying restrictions of many aggregate demand driven business cycle models." While one response to the negative correlation between prices and output has been to reject demand driven models, several authors have offered other explanations. Friedman and Schwartz (1982: 402) note that statistical errors can lead to a negative correlation between prices and output, since the computations of the price level, nominal output and real output are not independent of one another. They also note that differences in the dynamic response of prices and output to a demand shock may help explain the observed negative correlation. In line with the latter observation, Judd and Trehan (1995) , Chada and Prasad (1993) , and Rotemberg (1996) develop models that show that a negative correlation between prices and output can be generated in a demand driven model. This occurs because of the lag structure in price and output determination.
Another approach is to examine data with a VAR model capable of distinguishing changes in output caused by demand-side shocks from those caused by supply-side shocks. Spencer (1995) does this using a structural VAR and finds that both aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks have been important in the United States since 1954. den Haan (2000) shows how to use a VAR to calculate correlation coefficients at different forecast horizons and finds that the short term correlation between prices and output is positive, but that the long-term correlation is negative. He interprets this as evidence of price stickiness in the short run with a classical long run. He concludes that both aggregate supply and demand shocks must be included in a model in order to explain the observed data.
Although the work of the above-mentioned authors, as well as others, are valuable and offer potentially important explanations of the negative price-output correlation and commentaries on its importance, none of them explicitly examine the effect of monetary policy on the price-output correlation. Some recent research, however, has begun to close this gap in the literature. Pakko (2000) examines the cosprectum of output and price fluctuations using quarterly data from 1875-1994 for various sample periods. There are no important negative correlations during the pre-and inter-war periods. During the post-war period the negative correlations occur at low frequencies, while positive correlations tend to come at the higher end of the range of business cycle frequencies. Pakko goes on to examine the cospectrum implied by a neo-classical growth model with a shopping-time model of money demand, an endogenous money supply and a productivity shock. He finds that the price-output cospectrum is negative at all frequencies in response to a productivity shock if there is a constant growth money rule, but can be made positive at all frequencies by allowing the money-supply to respond endogenously to output and the stock of money during the previous period. Hence, he concludes (as do Gavin and Kydland (1999) ) that monetary policy can change the price-output correlation.
Because monetary policy in Pakko (2000) is represented by a simple feedback rule, it is not clear what changes in the policy parameters mean in terms of the ultimate goals of the monetary authority. In contrast Flodén (2000) offers an examination of how an optimal monetary policy can affect the correlations between real and nominal variables in a general equilibrium model with nominal wage rigidity. In Flodén's model the monetary authority minimizes a quadratic loss function that depends on deviations of output and the rate of inflation from their target values. For the parameter values that he examines, the price-output correlation is always negative, so Flodén is not able to offer an explanation for a change in the sign of this correlation.
However, he does find that a small increase in the monetary authority's preference for output stability increases the absolute value of this negative price-output corrrelation. This paper also examines the effect of monetary policy on the price-output correlation, but in so doing is able to propose an explanation for the change from a positive to negative correlation that not only is different from the above explanations, but also, we believe, of fundamental importance. In a simple aggregate supply and demand framework, we show that the introduction of an optimal monetary policy generally tends to lower the price-output correlation and can make it negative. Further, we show that the observation of a negative correlation tells us nothing about the magnitude of aggregate supply shocks relative to aggregate demand shocks.
There are several key differences between our work and that of Flodén (2000) . Whereas Flodén must use model simulations to determine how policy affects the correlation between output and the price level, the model in this paper is simple enough to be solved analytically.
This allows us to examine a wider range of policy preferences. 2 Second, Flodén's model contains only an aggregate supply shock and a shock to the money supply. There are no aggregate demand shocks to which the monetary authority must respond when stabilizing output and the price level, and therefore the relative size of aggregate demand and supply shocks is an issue that cannot be addressed in his model. Third, although Flodén examines the effect of changes in policy maker preferences on the correlations between real and nominal variables, he does not consider how an increase in the effectiveness of monetary policy affects the magnitude and sign of the price-output correlation.
By contrast, we show that a more effective monetary policy tends to make this correlation negative. Finally, we assume that the monetary authority uses an interest rate instrument, while Flodén assumes that it commits to an optimal money supply rule.
The Model
The basic model consists of the following five equations.
IS:
Fisher:R t = r t + t p t+1 -p t , where t p t+1 -p t = t π t+1 is expected inflation.
AS:
Loss :
Time subscripts are denoted by t. Equation (1) is an IS curve that states that output demand decreases as the real interest rate increases. 3 Equation (2) is a portfolio equilibrium condition or LM curve that states real money balances demanded increases as output demanded increases and as the nominal rate of interest decreases. Equation (3) is a Fisher equation that states the relationship between the real rate of interest, the nominal rate of interest and expected inflation. Equation (4) is an expectations augmented aggregate supply curve. 4 As γ in equation (4) approaches zero, the aggregate supply curve becomes vertical and the model approaches a real business cycle model.
On the other hand, as γ increases without bound, the aggregate supply curve becomes very flat and the model approaches a Keynesian model in which fluctuations in aggregate demand affect output with practically no effect on the price level. 5 Finally, equation (5) 
In order to come up with an expression for t p t+1 we must analyze how economic actors during period t evaluate policy during period t+1. The loss function during period t+1 is
If we define y _ to be c, then the loss function becomes
We can apply the expectations operator to (6), conditional on information available during period t. Let E t represent this expectations operator. This yields
Now we can take the first derivative of (7) IS:
This makes solving the model exceedingly simple. It turns out that this result also holds if the monetary authority does not directly control the price level. 
How policy affects the correlation between the price level and output
Suppose the loss function (equation (5) then the correlation coefficient between unexpected prices and output would be positive. Notice that as γ becomes smaller, and/or as the variance of the supply-side disturbance, σ 3 2 , becomes larger, the above condition eventually will not hold and the correlation coefficient between unexpected output and prices becomes negative. In the real business cycle (RBC) model, the aggregate supply curve is vertical, even in the short run, corresponding to γ = 0. When γ = 0, the price-output correlation must be negative. This sort of result is implicit in the idea that the sign of the price-output correlation has implications for the cause of business cycles because it suggests that a negative correlation implies that demand-side disturbances have a relatively small effect on output. But as the remainder of this section shows, policy affects the price-output correlation, and therefore such an inference does not necessarily follow.
Optimal policy when the output target reflects the supply shock
This subsection outlines how policy is implemented assuming that policymakers adjust their output target to reflect their estimate of the aggregate supply shock in the current period. We do this first assuming that shocks are observed without error and then derive the solutions when shocks are observed with error.
The shocks are observed without error
It is assumed that the goal of monetary policy is to minimize the monetary authority's loss function, equation (5) . But the monetary authority cannot control the price level directly, rather it can do so only indirectly by controlling either the rate of interest or the money stock. Here it is assumed that the monetary authority uses an interest rate instrument. It is assumed, then, that monetary policy is implemented in the following way. From the loss function, (5), the monetary authority determines its desired price level for period t, then it chooses the rate of interest, R t , which it believes will cause the price level during period t to be equal to its target value.
Assume that in the loss function the target value of output includes the current supply shock, making y
Since t-1 p t = p t-1 -π _ , the loss function can be rewritten as
By inspection, it is clear that equation (8) implies that the optimal value of p t is always
, the optimal level of output is the target level of output, c + ε 3,t . Hence, if the monetary authority has full information, then it will cause output demanded equal to c + ε 3,t . This is done by rewriting equation (1) as
and replacing y t d with c + ε 3,t . The result is
If equation (9) is inserted into equation (1), the result is y t = c + ε 3,t . If equation (4) We have assumed here that the policy maker wants to recenter his output target in response to the aggregate supply shock. Thus, the policy maker does not wish to offset the effects of aggregate supply shocks on output, and both π _ and y _ are hit with precision each period.
Policy with errors.
In 
where the estimated values of these shocks are µ 3,t and µ 1,t and that the observation errors are η 3,t and η 1,t . It is assumed that E(ε 1,t ⋅η 1,t ) = E(ε 3,t ⋅η 3,t ) = 0 and that the η i,t have mean 0 and variance σ ηi 2 . We also assume that there is a zero covariance between the observation errors so that
When policy is implemented in practice instead of setting the rate of interest according to equation (9), the chosen rate of interest is
Thus, the chosen interest rate reflects the policy maker's best estimate of the shocks, rather than the shocks themselves. Inserting (11) and (10a) into (1) yields
Inserting (12) and (10b) into (4) and solving for the price level yields
Equations (12) and (13) allow the price-output correlation coefficient to be calculated.
The unexpected level of output, given information available at the end of period t-1, when the target output includes supply shocks is y t -c = µ 3,t -η 1,t . Hence the variance of unexpected output is σ y 2 = σ 3 2 +σ η3 2 + σ η1 2 . Similarly, the unexpected change in the price level is
. Finally, the covariance between unexpected output and the unexpected change in the price level is
This makes the price-output correlation coefficient
According to equation (14), the price-output correlation coefficient must be positive and depends entirely on the observation errors. If the variances of both observation errors approach zero (σ η3 , σ η1 → 0), or as the variance of the aggregate supply shock increases without bound (σ 3 → ∞ ), then ρ yp approaches zero. But the key result is that optimal policy-making causes the price-output correlation coefficient to be positive. This is true regardless of the size of the variance of the aggregate supply shock, σ 3 2 , relative to that of the aggregate demand shock, σ 1 2 .
This result reflects two factors. First, the target level of output, y _ , is adjusted for supply shocks. The policy maker does not wish to stabilize output against its estimate of the aggregate supply shock. As a result, there is no trade-off between price and output stability faced by the policy maker. The losses suffered by the policy maker are due to an inability to perfectly observe the shocks rather than some unavoidable trade-off between price and output stability. Second, with an interest rate target, the aggregate demand curve is vertical. As a result, an unobserved aggregate supply shock affects the price level, but not output, and so cannot be a source of a negative correlation between prices and output.
If policy is implemented in an optimal manner, it affects the price-output correlation coefficient. Furthermore, the better this policy is (as measured by smaller variances of the observation errors, σ η3 2 and σ η1 2 ), the smaller the correlation coefficient. Can the price-output correlation coefficient be negative when policy is optimal? The answer is yes if the target value of output is not adjusted for supply shocks, as is shown in the following section.
Optimal policy when the output target does not include supply shocks
From a normative standpoint, it could be argued that the policy authority should not seek to offset supply shocks, but our interest here is in constructing a positive model. The model where the output target is adjusted to reflect supply shocks produces a positive correlation between prices and output regardless of the relative magnitudes of supply and demand shocks.
Since this result appears counterfactual, we will now examine a model in which the monetary authority does not adjust target output to reflect the presence of aggregate supply shocks. The resulting loss function is
Since it is still the case that t-1 p t = p t-1 -π _ , the loss function may be written as
Taking the first derivative of the loss function with respect to p t and setting the result equal to zero yields,
Inserting (16) into (4) yields
Insert (17) in (1') to find that the target rate of interest is
Equation (17) is the optimal level of output for policy makers under full information, but since their measurement of ε 3,t is equal to µ 3,t (= ε 3,t + η 3,t ) and their measure of ε 1,t is equal to µ 1,t (= ε 1,t + η 1,t ), they set the rate of interest according to
Inserting (19) into (1') yields
Inserting (20) into (4) and solving for the price level yields
Notice that (21) reduces to (16) if it is assumed that both η 1,t and η 3,t always equal zero.
Equations (20) and (21) imply
where
Equations (22a-c) imply the following expression for the price-output correlation coefficient.
Equation ( On the other hand, if
then the price-output correlation becomes negative. Since this is not possible if Ω equals either zero or one, policymakers must put some weight on both inflation and output in order for the correlation coefficient to be negative. Clearly, the smaller the variances of the observation errors and the larger the variance of the supply shock, the more likely it is that the correlation coefficient is negative. However, a negative correlation coefficient tells us nothing about the relative size of the aggregate demand shock, σ 1 2 , compared to the aggregate supply shock, σ 3 2 , since the policy maker always completely offsets the aggregate demand shock based on his best estimate of its magnitude.
Assume that the values of γ and Ω are such that (24) is satisfied and the correlation coefficient is negative. Now let γ approach zero, i.e., let the economy approach the RBC model. 11 The left hand side of (24) approaches zero, while the right hand side approaches
σ η3 2 and therefore remains positive. Thus, as we approach the RBC model, the price-output correlation must become positive.
As γ becomes small, the monetary authority can raise output only at the cost of very large increases in the price level. As it becomes prohibitively costly to reduce output variance, the monetary authority essentially gives up on output stabilization in favor of price stabilization.
With, in effect one goal, the monetary authority does not face a policy trade-off and could hit this goal with precision if there were not observation errors. Thus, the observation errors, which affect only the position of the aggregate demand curve, lead to a positive price-output correlation.
It is significant that with an optimizing policy maker, as we approach the real business cycle model we obtain a prediction of a positive rather than a negative correlation between prices and output.
On the other hand, as γ becomes very large, the model becomes more like a Keynesian model, where increases in demand have a large effect on output and only a small effect on the price level. But in (24) the middle term, ∆ 2 σ η1 2 , contains γ 4 , which means once γ becomes greater than one, the right-hand side of (24) increases more rapidly than the left-hand side of (24). So eventually, if γ becomes large enough, the correlation coefficient also becomes positive. This result obtains because, once again, the monetary authority essentially has only one target. As γ becomes increasingly large, the relatively flat aggregate supply curve implies that the cost of reducing price level instability becomes prohibitively costly in terms of increased output instability.
If policy is implemented optimally, but target output is not adjusted for supply shocks, then output must be responsive, but not too responsive to unexpected changes in the price level in order for the price-output correlation coefficient to be negative.
The Correlation between money and output
Although it has received less attention than the cyclical behavior of prices, the correlation of the nominal stock of money with output has also received some attention in the literature.
Backus and Kehoe (1992) do not find the same systemtic change over time across countries in the correlation between money and real output that they find for prices. But they do find that the money-output correlation for the United States is lower during the post-war period than it was during both the pre-war and interwar periods. It turns out that an optimal policy can also cause a decline in the money-output correlation.
To see this note that equation (2) implies the following covariance between the stock of money and real output:
Equations (11) and (12) imply that σ yR is negative, so kσ y 2 -βσ yR in (25) is positive. But since an optimal policy can cause σ yp to decline and possibly become negative, the covariance between money and output can decline after the implementation of an optimal monetary policy.
Similarly, the covariance between money and the price level is
Equations (11) and (13) imply that σ pR is negative, so σ p 2 -βσ pR in (26) is positive. But again, if the implementation of an optimal monetary policy causes σ yp to decline and become negative, the covariance between money and the price level will also decline.
Equations (25) and (26) both suggest the possibility that the closer monetary policy is to being optimal, the more likely it is that it will appear that money has a relatively weak correlation with output and the price level. 
Summary and Conclusions
This paper uses a very simple aggregate supply and demand framework to show that a negative correlation between prices and output can arise from the implementation of an optimal monetary policy. In this framework, better policy making may be thought of as resulting from more precise estimates of shocks hitting the economy. As policy becomes better, the price-output correlation eventually becomes negative.
Oddly enough, the price-output correlation tends to become positive not only as the model approaches a Keynesian one with a relatively flat aggregate supply curve, but also as the model approaches a real-business cycle model with a relatively steep aggregate supply curve. As the aggregate supply curve becomes very steep, the cost of achieving its output target (in terms of losses due to inflation) becomes very high. Hence, policy will be implemented in a manner that tends to maintain the inflation target at the expense of output stability. Similarly, as the aggregate supply curve becomes very flat, the cost of achieving its inflation target (in terms of losses due to output) becomes very high. Hence policy will be implemented in a manner that tends to maintain the output target at the expense of price instability. In both cases the optimal policy prevents the existence of aggregate supply shocks from affecting the correlation between prices and output. As a result policy observation errors, which work entirely through aggregate demand, cause the correlation between prices and output to be positive.
Hence, our results suggest the following. If the Fed has been implementing anything close to an optimal monetary policy, then it would be a mistake to model the United States economy with a model with extreme properties, such as one in which aggregate demand does not affect the price level, or one in which it does not affect output.
While the negative correlation does not, in an of itself, allow us to draw conclusions about the relative sizes of supply and demand shocks, it is significant that for nine of the ten countries analyzed by Backus and Kehoe (1992: 879) , the price-output correlation either becomes less positive, moves from positive to negative or becomes more negative when we compare the pre World War I period to the post World War II period. 13 Most countries were operating under the gold standard in the earlier period and so had very limited monetary discretion. As a result, aggregate demand shocks would not have been offset in this earlier period. Under monetary discretion, our model predicts greater aggregate demand stability and the changes in the priceoutput correlations in these countries bears this out. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the countries analyzed by Backus and Kehoe were more classical in the post WW II period, when the price output correlation is negative than in the pre WW I period when it is positive.
A negative price-output correlation can arise either because supply shocks are large, or because monetary policy is effective. The changes in the price-output correlation reported in 
_ .
We get this result because, during period t+1, p t and t p t+1 are predetermined and not affected by policy actually implemented during period t+1.
9. Although for our purposes the source of this assumed information advantage is not important, Romer and Romer (2000) demonstrate its existence and attribute it to the Federal Reserve's relatively large resource commitment to forecasting (p. 437).
10. The essential features of our results do not change if we allow for a nonzero covariance between the observation errors. Results from this case are available from the authors upon request.
11. As mentioned in footnote 3, when γ reaches the limiting value of zero, the model breaks down. The reason is that in the RBC model, we have a vertical aggregate supply curve, while under interest rate targeting with a fixed expected rate of inflation, we have a vertical aggregate demand curve. Thus in the limit, there is either no equilibrium, or an indeterminate price level.
12. See, for example, Chatterjee (1999) and Lucas (1994) .
